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Sammendrag 
Hovedformålet med den norske pensjonsreformen av 2011 er å styrke offentlige finanser på lang sikt. 
Intensjonen er at dette i hovedsak skal skje uten store kutt i pensjonsytelsene, men ved økt 
sysselsetting som øker opptjente rettigheter til alderspensjon. Primært antas dette å skje ved utsatt 
avgang. I tillegg innebærer reformen en sterkere sammenheng mellom inntekt og pensjon som 
forventes å stimulere yrkesaktives arbeidstilbud. Andre viktige reformelementer er universell adgang 
for yrkesaktive til å gå av som alderspensjonist fra 62 år, gitt tilstrekkelig opptjening. Fra denne 
alderen kan man heve alderspensjon mens man arbeider. Et annet nøkkelelement er 
delingstallsmodellen. Den innebærer lavere løpende pensjonsutbetaling, utfra aktuariske prinsipper, 
når forventet antall år som pensjonsmottaker øker som følge av levealderøkning eller tidlig uttak av 
pensjon. Denne formen for levealdersjustering av pensjonene kan dermed motvirkes ved økt 
arbeidsinnsats, herunder utsatt avgang. Slike tilnærmet aktuariske mekanismer fantes ikke i 
Folketrygden før reformen.  
 
Dette paperet søker å gi en tallfestet evaluering av i hvilken grad målene for pensjonsreformen vil nås. 
Vi baserer oss på en kombinasjon to modelltyper; en dynamisk mikrosimuleringsmodell, MOSART, 
beregner sysselsetting, antall alders- og uførepensjonister, samt individuelle alderspensjons og 
uførepensjonsytelser. Totaltallene for disse størrelsene legges inn i en generell likevektsmodell, 
DEMEC, som beregner effekter på alle skattegrunnlag og offentlige utgifter. Den detaljerte 
beskrivelsen av befolkningen, inntektshistorier og relevant regelverk i MOSART innebærer svært 
eksakte beregninger av statens pensjonsutgifter under ulike forutsetninger. DEMEC fanger opp 
generelle likevektseffekter som er viktige for den offentlige budsjettbalansen. Spesielt får vi tatt 
hensyn til at nesten alle skattegrunnlag i fastlandsøkonomien øker tilnærmet proporsjonalt med økt 
sysselsetting. Vi er ikke kjent med at den statsfinansielle effekten av en faktisk pensjonsreform 
tidligere har vært beregnet ved denne kombinasjonen av relevant detaljrikdom og viktige 
makroøkonomiske likevektseffekter.   
 
Beregningene viser at pensjonsreformen sannsynligvis vil bidra sterkt til å styrke offentlige finanser på 
lang sikt. Dersom det tidligere systemet var blitt videreført, ville det i 2060 vært nødvendig med en 
skatteøkning og/eller et kutt i offentlige utgifter tilsvarende 8,7 prosent av Fastlands-Norges BNP for 
at handlingsregelen skal oppfylles. Reformen reduserer dette målet på nødvendig innstramning til 2,8 
prosent. Styrkingen av offentlige finanser kommer gjennom både økte skatteinntekter og lavere 
offentlige pensjonsutgifter. Begge effektene skyldes først og fremst at yrkesaktive utsetter avgangen. 
Effekten på avgangsalderen forsterkes over tid i takt med økningen i levealderen. I 2060 anslås 
sysselsettingen å bli 7,1 prosent høyere med den nye Folketrygden enn den ville vært uten reform. 
Reformeffektene forsterkes desto mer levealderen øker og desto mer arbeidstilbudet reagerer på de nye 
insentivene. Reformeffektene er robust overfor variasjoner i tidlig uttak av alderspensjon og graden av 
skjerming av tidligere uføres alderspensjon. 
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1. Introduction 
The main goal of most public pension reforms implemented in many countries over the last decades 
has been to improve government finances in the long run. They are a policy response to population 
ageing, which will increase problems of fiscal sustainability of welfare states. Most pension reforms 
have been designed to strengthen government finances by encouraging employment, and thereby tax 
revenues, in order to mitigate unpopular benefit cuts. 1 In particular, a key objective has been to 
increase the effective retirement age. At the same time, the reforms have typically tried to maintain 
much of the redistributive effects built into the former public pension systems. These goals and 
concerns also characterize the Norwegian pension reform implemented in 2011. The purpose of this 
paper is to assess as realistically as possible to what extent the Norwegian reform is likely to improve 
government finances in the long run.  
 
A long run perspective on the fiscal reform effects is particularly relevant for Norway, because the 
government finances look impressively solid in a short and medium-term perspective, as opposed to 
most other OECD economies. This reflects the fiscal rule implemented in 2001, which implies that the 
large government petroleum revenues are saved in a sovereign wealth fund. The fund assets passed 2.3 
times GDP by the end of 2014. However, the projections in this paper show that also Norway faces 
severe fiscal sustainability problems in the long run, since ageing combined with prolongation of the 
present welfare schemes implies that government expenditures will outgrow the tax bases after 2025.2 
At the same time, the solid government finances have allowed Norway to emphasize the long run 
properties of the new public pension system to a stronger degree than countries already struggling with 
strained government finances.  
 
A profound analysis of pension reforms is a demanding modelling task because it should integrate 
three types of effects.3 First, huge amounts of details are required to provide an operational and 
relevant description of the reform elements, such as e.g. threshold values, coordination with 
occupational private pension schemes, special arrangements for low-income groups, temporary rules 
phased out during transition periods and other exceptions from main principles. In addition the model 
should capture the heterogeneity of individual earning profiles and other aspects of individual life 
courses. Such details are not only important for the re-distributional properties of the system, but also 
for accurate computations of the aggregate public pension expenditures. Dynamic Microsimulation 
                                                     
1 OECD (2013a) provides an overview of pension reforms in the OECD-area in recent years. 
2 These long run problems of fiscal sustainability in Norway have been pointed out in several reports and papers, see e.g. 
Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) and the Ministry of Finance (2013). 
3 Galaasen, Holmøy and Stølen (2015) survey model based studies of pension reforms. 
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(DMS) models provide such details, which make them frequently used by the authorities to compute 
effects on individual benefits and public pension expenditures. In the terminology of Gruber and Wise 
(2004) they capture the mechanical effects in the sense that they ignore behavioural adjustments and 
general equilibrium repercussions. Flood (2007), Morrison (2007), Blanchet and Minez (2009) and 
Leombruni and Mosca (2014) are but a few examples of studies using DMS models to estimate 
mechanical pension reform effects. Norwegian studies in this tradition include Fredriksen and Stølen 
(2007, 2011 and 2014). The Norwegian authorities have also used DMS models in the reform 
preparations. This practice seems to be an exception compared with pension reform preparations in 
other countries. 
 
Second, realistic estimates should capture that pension reforms indeed intend to affect behaviour, 
notably labour supply. A vast empirical literature has studied how pension schemes affect labour 
supply, especially through retirement; see Gruber and Wise (2004) for a comprehensive overview. In 
their summary of 12 comparable microeconometric country studies, Gruber and Wise conclude that 
the pension system has a “strong effect on retirement”. Observed patterns in the first years after the 
Norwegian pension reform are consistent with a positive reform effect on the age of retirement; see 
Hernæs et al. (2015).  
 
Third, the mechanical and the behavioural responses to plausible pension reforms are likely to be 
strong enough to cause significant general equilibrium repercussions in a long run perspective, 
motivating the use of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models pension reform analyses. A 
good illustration of the potential power of equilibrium effects is Coile and Gruber (2003). Their 
estimated effects on the budget deficit of a US Social Security reform reflect just the expansion of tax 
bases, whereas actuarial mechanisms leave expenditures almost unaffected. In a study of a Norwegian 
pension reform proposal, also Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) find a stronger fiscal contribution from 
expansion of tax bases than from lower pension expenditures. Beetsma, Bettendorf and Broer (2003) 
and Bovenberg and Knaap (2005) use CGE models with overlapping generations (OLG) in the 
tradition pioneered by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) to assess budget and economic consequences of 
stylized pension reforms in the Netherlands. Fehr (2009) surveys the use of stochastic CGE models in 
analyses of population ageing and pension reforms. Relatively recent topics in this literature include, 
the transition between steady states, uncertainty and risk sharing, social efficiency effects, as well as 
inter- and intra-generational income distribution effects. Papers addressing these issues include e.g. 
Conesa and Krueger (1999), Krueger and Kubler (2006), Nishiyama and Smetters (2007), Fehr and 
Habermann (2008), Harenberg and Ludwig (2014). Fehr, Haberman and Kindermann (2008) introduce 
hyperbolic discounting in an analysis of the welfare effects of the German social security system. Hirte 
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(2002) introduced optimal retirement in an OLG model. Such behavior is also included in the analyses 
of stylized pension reforms in Eisensee (2006), Fehr, Kallweit and Kindermann (2012) and 
Imrohorglu and Kitao (2012), as well as in the studies of Spanish pension reform in Díaz-Giménez and 
Díaz-Saavedra (2009) and Sánchez Martín (2010). Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2012) introduce both 
optimal retirement and benefit claiming in a dynamic stochastic OLG-CGE model of the US economy. 
Galaasen (2014a, 2014b) uses the same modelling approach in a study of the Norwegian pension 
reform of 2011.  
 
This study of the fiscal effects of the Norwegian pension reform of 2011 takes the three 
abovementioned types of effects into account by combining a detailed DMS model with a CGE 
model.4 Since our DMS model captures all details in the former and the new pension system, as well 
as an almost complete representation of the relevant population heterogeneity, we are able to produce 
more accurate estimates of the public pension expenditures than pure CGE-analyses, contingent on 
individual age-earnings profiles. Whereas most of the papers referred to above study stylized reforms, 
the ability to account for details allow us to address the effects of an actual pension reform. Our CGE 
model is designed to capture those mechanisms that are most important in analyses of long run fiscal 
effects. In particular, it provides a rather detailed determination of the bases for direct and indirect 
taxes. Our paper shares the same main purpose and approach as Holmøy and Stensnes (2008), but 
differs from the latter and other previous Norwegian reform studies by analysing the implemented 
reform rather than reform proposals, by providing another set of sensitivity analyses, and by 
considering other mechanisms for neutralizing the fiscal reform effects through tax adjustments. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the main elements of the 
present Norwegian pension system and the implemented reform. Section 3 describes the 
microsimulation and the CGE models. Section 4 discusses the effects of the reform on total 
employment. Section 5 discusses the reform effects on government finances and employment. Section 
6 analyses the robustness of the reform effects with respect to assumptions on longevity, labour supply 
responses, withdrawal of benefits, and the degree of protecting the former disabled old-age pensioners 
from the actuarial mechanisms built into the new pension system. Section 7 concludes.  
                                                     
4 Linking micro- and macroeconomic models is discussed by Cockburn, Savard and Tiberti (2014). 
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2. The Norwegian public pension reform 
2.1. The former system 
The old National Insurance System was established in 1967. Over time this public pension system has 
developed as a mandatory, defined benefit, pay-as-you-go pension system. Christensen et al. (2012) 
and Fredriksen and Stølen (2014) describe its main elements. Although the new system was 
implemented in 2011, the accrual of entitlements is still entirely based on the rules from the old system 
for new cohorts of pensioners born up to 1953. The new rules for accrual of entitlements will 
gradually be phased in for cohorts born between 1954 and 1963. In the old system the accrual of 
entitlements for old-age benefits were determined according to the formula: 
   
Pension benefit = universal benefit + max(special supplement, income benefit). 
 
The income benefit is based on pension entitlements accrued through labour market earnings after 
1967. In addition, imputed pension entitlements are granted to parents caring for young children and 
recipients of social security benefits compensating for unemployment, sickness, rehabilitation, and 
disability. Both entitlements and benefits have in principle been wage indexed, although practice in 
past periods has tended to fall somewhat short of this intention. In the stylised case where an 
individual earns the average wage for 40 years, the after-tax replacement ratio of the public old age 
benefit is about 65 percent.5  
 
Accrual of pension entitlements according to the old system includes several non-actuarial elements. 
Most important is the rule according to which a full benefit requires 40 years of accumulation, and the 
best-years rule saying that entitlements will only be calculated using the 20 years with highest 
earnings. On average, the non-linear elements result in a relatively weak income dependency of 
pension benefits. Simulations with the microsimulation model used in this paper, show that increasing 
earnings by 1 NOK raises the average present value of future pension benefits only by 0.10 NOK, see 
Stensnes (2007). Moreover, this income dependency is hard to compute ex ante, and varies highly 
across individuals, which probably weakens the labour supply incentive of the income dependency. 
 
With the former system the formal retirement age was 67 years up to 2010. But about 60 percent of the 
(still) employed at the age of 62 were entitled to an early retirement from this age. In addition roughly 
                                                     
5 Special tax rules for pension benefits makes the after-tax replacement ratio about 15 percentage points higher than the 
corresponding pre-tax ratio. Income from private pension schemes and special pension schemes for public employees come 
in addition to this figure. 
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40 percent of the population received disability benefits at the age of 67. Disability pension and early 
retirement thus imply that the present effective retirement age averages about 60 years in Norway. 
Note that early retirement through these arrangements did not reduce future pension benefits at any 
point in time with the old system, neither because of a shorter period of labour market earnings nor 
through a longer period as pensioner. Both disability pensioners and early retirees obtained 
entitlements as if they remained working until the age of 67. 
2.2 Key reform elements  
Except for the rules for accumulation of entitlements, the main elements of the new system were 
implemented from 2011. In addition to the general description of the pension system in Christensen et 
al. (2012) and Fredriksen and Stølen (2014), the new system is described in more detail in Fredriksen 
and Stølen (2011). The new system continues to be a defined benefit system financed on a pay-as-you-
go basis. The reform is designed to reduce the long run growth in future government pension 
expenditures and to stimulate labour supply, maintaining most of the distributional properties of the 
old system. The most important reform elements are: 
1. The pension benefit continues to include two components, a minimum income guarantee and an 
earnings-based benefit. At implementation the minimum benefit was maintained at the same level 
as in the old system. Contrary to the former system, where the special supplement was means-
tested by 100 percent against the income benefit, the means-testing of the guarantee pension is re-
duced to 80 percent. The new indexation rules imply that the guarantee benefit is indexed by wage 
growth adjusted for growth in life expectancy.  
2. Most of the expenditure risk associated with increases in longevity is shifted from tax payers onto 
each cohort of pensioners through an actuarial mechanism. The new system converts the implicit 
pension wealth of accumulated entitlements into an annuity over the average expected remaining 
lifetime. An increase in the expected number of retirement years reduces the annual benefit such 
that the present value of total pension benefits is nearly invariant to changes in current remaining 
life expectancy and retirement age. This is one implementation of what Lindbeck (2006) identifies 
as an “automatic rule mimicking the functioning of actuarially fair private income insurance sys-
tems”.6 
3. In the private sector the statutory retirement age and former early retirement arrangements were 
phased out and replaced with a flexible retirement age from the age of 62 years, available to everyone 
who has accumulated enough entitlements to achieve a greater pension than the minimum pension. 
                                                     
6 However, special rules imply deviations from an exact actuarial adjustment. For instance, the annual benefits and pension 
premium are independent of gender and other observable characteristics correlated with life expectancy. See Stølen (2007) 
for details. 
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The life expectancy adjustment mechanism described in point 2 intends to stimulate labour supply by 
increasing the individual cost of early retirement. If life expectancy increases by one year, an addi-
tional eight months of labour market participation will be needed to maintain the annual benefit.  
4. Labour supply is also stimulated by a stronger dependency between earnings and old-age pension 
benefits. Both the limits of 40 years to obtain maximum benefits and the “20 best years count rule” 
are abolished. The annual accumulation of entitlements is basically 18.1 percent of labour incomes 
below a threshold of approximately 115 percent of average labour incomes.  
5. The income dependent entitlements are indexed by wage growth until retirement. After retirement 
pension benefits in payments are indexed by an average of wages and consumer prices.7  
 
Disability pensioners are transferred to old age pensions at the age of 67. By introducing a weaker life 
expectancy adjustment for earlier disabled, the reform may strengthen the incentives to retire as a 
disability pensioner. Our analysis takes the observed rates of transition into disability as given.  
 
An agreement on the intended inclusion of the early retirement scheme in the new actuarial system was 
obtained for the private sector in the negotiations between the labour market organizations in 2008. 
However, the same agreement has not achieved in the public sector. Here, the old early retirement 
scheme has been preserved between ages 62 and 66, whereas the principles from the new actuarial 
system are implemented from the age of 67 with a guarantee that the replacement rate shall not drop 
below 66 percent for cohorts born up to 1958 retiring at that age. Thus, the incentives to delay 
retirement are weaker for employees in the public sector than in the private sector, and the total effect 
on labour supply will be somewhat weaker than predicted by the Pension Commission (NOU 2004). 
  
The cuts in expenditures as a result of the reform are caused by the actuarial life expectancy 
adjustment, and the less generous indexation of benefits in payment. To the extent that postponed 
retirement counteracts the reduction of average annual benefit, the fiscal improvement will also be 
stimulated by increased tax revenues.  
3. Modelling framework 
Our ambition of providing realistic estimates of the total fiscal effects of a fully specified pension reform 
imposes four fundamental requirements: First, accounting for system complexity requires an accurate 
description of most elements in the former and the new pension systems. Specifically, one must account 
                                                     
7 In practice, the reform implements the less generous indexation in payment as a fixed annual deduction of 0.75 percentage 
points relative to wage indexation. This is consistent with an implicit real wage increase of 1.5 percent.  
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for the complex interplay between minimum guarantees and earnings-dependent pensions. Second, a 
detailed description of population heterogeneity with respect to age and income is necessary for accurate 
calculations of individual and aggregate pension entitlements and benefits. In particular, the increasing 
trend of female labour supply implies a surge in the future old-age entitlements of women. Third, the 
simulations should take into account that changes in employment affect most tax bases, not only taxes on 
personal income. Fourth, analyses of fiscal effects of pension reform require a long-run perspective, both 
because they address long run demographic changes and because the relevance of many behavioural and 
equilibrium effects is stronger in the long run. The integrated micro-macro model framework used in this 
paper is designed to meet these requirements. Admittedly, it is complex, but a more simple and 
transparent model framework would necessarily produce less realistic estimates. 
3.1 The dynamic microsimulation model 
Tax and pension systems are typically detailed and complex and individuals may face different rules. 
Accordingly, there are substantial aggregation problems when calculating the total effect on 
government budgets of changes in tax or pension systems. Microsimulation models overcome these 
problems; see e.g. Orcutt et al. (1986). The basic idea in microsimulation modelling is to represent a 
socio-economic system by a sample of decision units (e.g. persons), and then model the behaviour of 
these primary units. Contrary to what is possible in aggregate models, specifying one or a few 
representative agents, micro simulation models allows an exact description of all details in e.g. the tax 
and/or the pension system. Such models have become increasingly used over the last decades to 
support governments with analyses of tax and pension reforms, as well as other policy changes 
intended to affect the personal incomes of specific groups.  
 
The model used in this paper, MOSART, is a dynamic microsimulation model, which has been 
developed over several years at Statistics Norway; see Fredriksen (1998) for documentation. 
MOSART is especially designed to analyse mechanical effects on individual pension entitlements, 
benefits, and government pension expenditures of changes in the Norwegian public pension system. 
The model simulates the life courses for the entire Norwegian population. Events, i.e. transitions 
between states over the life course, depend on individual characteristics, and the transition 
probabilities have been estimated from observations in a recent period. MOSART emphasizes events 
that are relevant for individuals’ accumulation of public pension entitlements, including migration, 
deaths, births, marriages, divorces, educational activities, retirement, and labour force participation. 
The model includes an accurate description of the pension rules and captures all relevant heterogeneity 
of individual age-earnings profiles. 
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3.2 The CGE Model 
The value-added of using the CGE model in this paper is to provide consistent and detailed accounts 
of the changes in government revenues and expenditures, and how the various budget components are 
affected by changes in demography and employment. The CGE simulations use the MOSART 
projections of the total labour force, the number of pensioners and pension expenditures as exogenous 
inputs. The CGE model (DEMEC) portrays the Norwegian economy as a standard small open 
economy; see Holmøy and Strøm (2012). All agents face exogenous world prices of exports and 
imports and an exogenous world interest rate. Goods and factors are perfectly mobile between 
industries. All production functions exhibit constant returns to scale. Productivity growth is exogenous 
and labour augmenting in all industries. All markets are perfectly competitive, and flexible relative 
prices ensure that all markets clear in all periods. Specifically, this implies that total employment is 
determined by labour supply, which is exogenous in DEMEC, but endogenous in MOSART. Section 4 
explains in detail the labour supply responses to the pension reform and other related exogenous 
variations discussed in this paper. The assumptions on exogenous world prices, constant returns and 
labour augmenting productivity growth imply that the shifts simulated by the CGE model in this paper 
will not affect relative prices and the composition of consumer goods or production factors.  
 
The properties of the CGE model imply that aggregate consumption possibilities are restricted by 
employment, productivity growth and a national budget constraint on the accumulation of net foreign 
wealth. We assume that the national financial savings equal the central government financial savings. 
We assume no financial savings in each of the other institutional sectors (households, local 
governments, corporations). The financial savings of the central government obeys a strict 
interpretation of the fiscal rule introduced in 2001. This rule implies: 1) All the cash flow from 
production of oil and gas collected by the central government are saved in a separate sovereign wealth 
fund called the Government Pension Fund; 2) the non-petroleum primary deficit equals the expected 
real rate of return on the assets. We assume this rate to stay constant at 3.5 percent in our simulation 
period.8 Given the exogenous path of government petroleum revenues, these two implications 
determine directly the time path of the government budget constraint.9  
 
                                                     
8 The fiscal rule has so far assumed a real rate of return of 4 percent. However, this is widely considered to be too optimistic, 
and more than the observed government spending of the petroleum wealth.  
9 Formally, the fiscal policy rule limits the non-petroleum primary deficit, D, to   1 tt BiD  , where i is the nominal rate 
of return, π is the expected international inflation, and B is the value of the accumulated assets. Net financial investments in 
the fund become tttt PBBB   11  , where P is government net petroleum cash flow. Since i, π and P are exogenous 
variables in DEMEC, the time paths of B and D are effectively exogenous. 
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We assume that the government budget constraint is met by endogenous pay-as-you-go adjustments of 
a lump-sum tax/transfer. This assumption is of course not made for the sake of realism. It is justified 
for two reasons. First, endogenous lump-sum tax adjustments make the pure reform effects most 
transparent, and these effects are the main issue of this paper. Endogenous adjustments of other tax 
rates would affect tax bases and government expenditures through equilibrium effects on relative 
prices. These effects would be hard to distinguish from the pure pension reform effects. Second, any 
selection of endogenous tax rates would be somewhat arbitrary, and we would risk that our analyses 
would stimulate discussions about tax reforms rather than the pension reform. 
3.3 Key Assumptions  
The projections of pension entitlements and benefits are based on detailed information for the entire 
Norwegian population up to 2010 and adjustments based on aggregate observations up to 2013. Most 
transition probabilities in MOSART are based on observed averages from 2008 to 2012. The CGE 
model is calibrated to the National Accounts of 2010, and the course of the main macroeconomic 
aggregates are in line with observations till 2013. 
 
The demographic projections are taken from the official projections, see Statistics Norway (2014) and 
Tønnessen, Syse and Aase. (2014). Statistics Norway considers the medium alternatives with respect 
to assumptions on fertility, mortality and migration to be most realistic. These assumptions imply that 
the number of those aged 20-66 divided by the number of those 67 and older decrease from 4.8 in 
2010 to 2.5 in 2060. The baby boom after World War II contributes to the strong decrease in this ratio 
in the nearest decades, whereas increased longevity drives the long run reduction. From 2013 till 2060 
the life expectancy of new-borns increases by 6.9 years for men and 5.6 years for women. For the 
effects of the pension reform, the conditional remaining expected life expectancy at the age 62 is 
particularly relevant. From 2013 till 2060 the increases for men and women are, respectively, 5.7 and 
4.3 years. The increase in the old-age dependency ratio is somewhat mitigated by immigration, which 
has been much higher after 2004 than in earlier years.  
 
Except from effects caused by the pension reform, we assume that both average future participation 
rates and working hours remain at their present levels in all population groups defined by gender, age 
and education. An increase in the average education levels contributes to a modest growth in 
participation and working hours over the simulation period. Except for the public old age pension 
system, the present welfare schemes, including wage indexation of most welfare transfers, are 
prolonged in all scenarios. Resources used in sectors producing public goods remain constant at 
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present per capita levels. For tax financed production of individual services (child care, education, 
health services, and long-term care) we prolong the most recent observations of the gender and age 
specific ratios of users per capita, whereas the corresponding service standards (= resources per user) 
are raised by 1 percent per year. The development of the world prices of crude oil and natural gas, as 
well as the government petroleum revenues are in line with the assumptions in the “Perspectives report 
2013” (Ministry of Finance, 2013). Table 1 summarizes other key macroeconomic assumptions.   
Table 1. Key macroeconomic assumptions. Average annual growth rates unless otherwise 
indicated. Percent  
Labour productivity growth in private industries 2.0 
Output expanding labour productivity growth in all government sectors 0.5 
Additional growth in the standard of hospital services and long-term care  0.5 
Nominal interest rate, level, percent 5.5 
Outtake from GPF, level, percent (from 2020) 3.5 
World prices 2.0 
Real price of crude oil, 2015-$, level 64 $ 
4. Employment effects 
Three kinds of employment effects may be expected as a consequence of the reform: 
1. Effects on working hours prior to retirement age caused by a closer connection between pen-
sion entitlements and former earnings with the new system 
2. Immediate effects on retirement 
3. Postponed retirement when life expectancy increases 
4.1. Effects on working-hours 
Changes in the system of accrual of pension entitlements create a closer connection between pension 
entitlements and former earnings with the new system. 
 The rule making entitlements dependent on the 20 years with highest labour incomes is 
abolished. 
 While 40 years of accumulation were necessary to achieve full pensions with the old system, 
labour incomes for more than 40 years may increase entitlements with the new. 
 While yearly incomes smaller than 1 BPU (Basic Pension Unit, equal to 1/6 of average annual 
labour incomes) do not produce any extra entitlements with the old model of accumulation, 
even small incomes count with the new system. 
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 With the old system incomes between 6 BPU (equal to average annual labour incomes) and 12 
BPU only produced 1/3 of full entitlements. With the new system full entitlements are 
accumulated up to yearly incomes of 7.1 BPU. Far more persons are in the interval 6 to 7.1 
BPU than above. 
 With the old system the special supplement for persons with low pension entitlements is 
means-tested with 100 percent against income pensions. With the new system the means-
testing of the guarantee pension against income pensions is reduced to 80 percent. 
  
Stensnes (2007) estimated the labour supply incentives at the intensive margin in the old and the new 
system. According to his estimates the reform implies that 1 NOK extra labour market earnings raises 
the present value of future pension benefits from 0.101 NOK to 0.157 NOK, on average. This 
corresponds to a 5.1 percent increase in the perceived effective wage rate. We consider this estimate as 
cautious, because it does not take into account that individual income dependency becomes more 
transparent and more similar between individuals in the new system. With a compensated labour 
supply elasticity of 0.5, the shift to the new pension system increases working hours prior to retirement 
by 2.5 percent.  
4.2. Effects on retirement  
Several studies find that labour supply is more elastic on the extensive than on the intensive margin, see 
e.g. Heckman (1993), Gruber and Wise (2004), Chan and Stevens (2003) and Immervoll et al. (2007).10 
In the first econometric study of the effects of the Norwegian pension reform on retirement, also Hernæs 
et al. (2015) find that the reform has a significant positive immediate effect on labour supply for 63-years 
old workers in the private sector with access to the former early retirement scheme. The analysis 
compares the 1946-1947 birth cohorts, who reached 63 years in the two years prior to the reform in 
2010-2011, with the 1949 cohort who reached 63 in 2012. The results are in accordance with previous 
analyses by Hernæs and Jia (2013) and Brinch et al. (2013) of the effects from the stepwise removal of 
the earnings test in the Norwegian public pension system for ages 67-69 over the period 2008-2010.  
 
In their analyses Hernæs et al. exploit that different groups of employees are affected in completely 
different ways by the reform. They divide the employees in three main groups: 
i) Employees in the public sector who all have access to the former early retirement scheme (AFP) 
ii) Employees in the private sector with access to AFP 
iii) Employees in the private sector with no access to AFP, including self employed 
                                                     
10 On the other hand, Samwick (1998) finds that levels of pension and other wealth are not major determinants of retirement. 
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Each of the three groups are further divided into two sub-groups dependent on whether the actual 
persons after the reform have accumulated enough entitlements to withdraw pensions at age 62 or not. 
Below the age of 67 withdrawal of pensions (and thereby retirement in reality) is not allowed if 
calculated old-age pensions are smaller than the minimum pension in the National Insurance System. In 
the private sector some persons entitled to AFP lost their right to retire early as a consequence of the 
reform because they have not accumulated enough entitlements at age 62. Hernæs et al. find a significant 
increase in employment and labour market earnings at age 63 for this group. This is also the case for the 
main group of employees with AFP in private sector with enough entitlements to withdraw pensions at 
age 62. For this group the new system means a complete removal of the confiscatory earnings test with 
the old system, implying a cut in AFP-pensions corresponding to labour earnings.      
 
Because the old system for AFP is maintained in the public sector, the reform implies no changes in 
either access age or work incentives between age 62 and 67. However, Hernæs et al. (2015) find a small 
significant effect on employment and labour earnings for persons in this group with enough entitlements 
to obtain social security pensions at age 62. Their interpretation of the finding is that some employees 
find it more attractive to continue in employment because it is also possible for employees in the public 
sector to combine employment with early pay-out from the social security pension. Employees in the 
private sector with no access to AFP, but with enough entitlements to retire at age 62, experience a 
reduction in access age as a result of the reform. Hernæs et al. (2015) find that this group has a small, but 
significant, reduction in their employment and labour earnings as a result of the reform. 
 
Although estimated parameters from empirical analyses like Hernæs et al. are taken into account in the 
implementation of transition probabilities in MOSART, it is difficult to establish a direct link. Transition 
probabilities for retirement are dependent on age, gender and by cohort via level of education and former 
earnings. The recent empirical results are quite in accordance with earlier assumptions of the effects 
implemented in the model. As a simplified illustration for the short term effects on retirement a couple of 
years after the reform, the total effect may be constructed by weighing together plausible effects for the 
three main groups mention above. 
 
For about 30 per cent of the employees in the private sector entitled to the early retirement scheme 
Fredriksen and Stølen (2007) assumed that they would delay retirement by 1.2 years as an immediate 
effect of the reform. This is in accordance with Brinch et al. (2001) who estimated that a hypothetical 
switch from the retirement incentives in the old system to those implied by a perfectly actuarial 
system, would delay retirement by 2.4 years on average. An assumed effect of only one half of this 
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implies that participation rates of the age groups 62-66 as an immediate effect of the reform could 
increase to about the average of the rates observed in 2010 and those observed in the early 1980s, 
when no early retirement schemes had been introduced. For employees in the public sector it was 
decided to maintain the old early retirement scheme. Consequently, the expected direct effect on 
participation rates for the group 62-66 is negligible. Because the reform implied a reduction of the 
minimum retirement age from 67 to 62 for the about 40 per cent of the employees in the private sector 
not entitled to the earlier retirement scheme, the empirical results by Hernæs et al. (2015) are quite in 
accordance with the earlier assumptions that the reform could reduce average retirement for this group 
by 0.3 years. An average immediate effect on retirement age, i.e. neglecting effects of increased life 
expectancy, may then be weighted to: 0.3 * 1.2 years + 0.3 * 0 years + 0.4 *(-0.3 years) = 0.24 years. 
This is somewhat lower than assumed in earlier analyses, e.g. Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) based on the 
assumption that the early retirement scheme in the public sector would be incorporated in the new 
system.  
 
Increasing life expectancy was likely to have only a negligible effect on retirement with the old system, 
since the annual benefit was independent of the number of years as a pensioner. With the new actuarial 
system increased life expectancy is likely to increase the retirement age through consumption 
smoothing, see e.g. Bloom, Canning and Moore (2004). The optimal response is then to trade some of 
the leisure increment for consumption, and postponing retirement is a probable response.  
 
A relative long period of observations after the reform is necessary to make empirical analyses of the 
effects from increased longevity on retirement age.  About 40 percent of the individuals will be 
unaffected by the changes in the early retirement incentives, since they are disabled before the age of 
62. Earlier disabled will be transferred to old age pensions at the age of 67. Disabled individuals 
cannot counteract the negative benefit effect of the life expectancy adjustment by extending their 
working career. The government has found it fair that the earlier disabled to some extent should be 
protected from the default life expectancy adjustment mechanism with the new system; the benefit cut 
implied by this mechanism is therefore reduced by 50 percent for the former disabled old-aged 
pensioners.  
 
Also when estimating possible effects from increased longevity on average retirement age, it is 
relevant to take into account that different groups may be affected differently. For those who work 
until they become old-age pensioners, we assume that 20 percent is so healthy that their delay of 
retirement equals the increase in life expectancy. For the remaining share of 50 percent working in the 
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private sector Fredriksen and Stølen (2007) and Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) assumed a delay of 
retirement equal to 2/3 of the increase in life expectancy. This response neutralizes the benefit cut 
caused by the life expectancy adjustment mechanism. While assuming a minor response for the 30 per 
cent working in the public sector, in sum these responses implies a 0.5 years delay of retirement for 
each year life expectancy increases (0.5 * 2/3 + 0.2 * 1 + 0.3 * 0 = 0.5). Because of the preservation of 
the old early retirement system in the public sector, also this estimate is reduced compared to earlier 
analyses.  
4.3. Total employment effects 
From 2013 to 2060 the average conditional remaining life expectancy for men and women of 62 years 
is expected to increase by about 5 years from 22.8 to 27.6 years. Adding the immediate reform effect 
on retirement of 0.24 years and the effect which increases with remaining life expectancy, implies that 
the average reform effect in 2060 equals 0.24 + 0.5*5 = 2.74 years for those who are not disabled at 
the age of 62. Also taking into account the positive effect on participation rate for persons younger 
than 62, we estimate the direct reform effect on the labour force in 2060 to 185 000 persons, or 5.5 
percent. Including the effect on average working hours at the intensive margin gives a total effect on 
man-hours in 2060 of 7.1 percent compared to the no-reform scenario.  
5. Fiscal effects 
We measure the fiscal effect by a normalized fiscal gap, defined as the deviation between the 
simulated government budget deficit and the deficit consistent with the fiscal rule. This gap is 
measured in current prices, and hard to interpret unless it is normalized. We normalize the gap by 
calculating its share of the simulated path for the current value of GDP for the mainland sector of the 
Norwegian economy, hereafter called GDP-M.11 This normalized fiscal gap has proved to be the most 
frequently used indicator of the fiscal stance in the Norwegian policy debate.  
5.1. A no-reform baseline scenario 
Figure 1 shows the projected normalized fiscal gap in the no-reform and the reform scenario. In all but 
the first three years after the implementation of the new system, the two gap scenarios are basically 
identical until 2020. In this period the fiscal rule allows successive cuts in tax rates and/or increases in 
government spending under our assumptions. In 2020 the possible reduction in government net 
                                                     
11GDP for the mainland economy equals total GDP minus value added in the sectors Ocean Transport and Production of 
Crude Oil and Natural Gas.  
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revenues would amount to 3.6 percent of the projected mainland GDP in this year, if the old pension 
system were maintained. However, after 2020 the no-reform scenario shows a continuous need for 
reversing the decrease in government net revenues. After 2035 the fiscal gap becomes positive, 
passing 8.7 percent of the projected mainland GDP in 2060.  
 
There are two key forces behind this fiscal gap dynamics. First, the adverse fiscal effect of ageing 
becomes significantly stronger when the growth in the population share of individuals of age 80 or 
more accelerates after 2020, since the use of tax financed health- and long-term care services is much 
higher for this group than for others. Second, the inflow of government petroleum revenues to the 
Government Pension Fund diminishes over the next 20 years, which causes a slowdown of the 4 
percent annual outtake from the fund.  
Figure 1. Simulated fiscal gap with the old and the new public pension system. Percent of GDP 
for the mainland economy 
 
 
The no-reform scenario motivates the question: Does Norway need pension reform or other welfare 
reforms in order to avoid severe fiscal sustainability problems? Figure 1 may justify both a “no” and a 
“yes” to this question. A “no” can be justified by considering the level of the fiscal gap, which is 
negative in all years until 2035. Simultaneously, the fiscal policy rule implies an unprecedented 
accumulation of financial assets. Thus, judged by the levels of government expenditures and tax bases 
within a 20-30 years perspective, Norway’s fiscal future looks bright. In particular, it looks much 
brighter than it did when the pension reform process was initiated. Then the real oil price was expected 
to average less than half of the level assumed in this paper. 
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On the other hand, Figure 1 also serves as a fiscal motivation for the pension reform if one emphasizes 
the growth trends after 2020 rather than the levels of government revenues and expenditures in a more 
or less arbitrarily selected year. Stronger growth in government expenditures than in the tax base after 
2020 will eventually undermine the impressive government finances. Sooner or later sustainable 
government finances require alignment of the growth rates of, respectively, government expenditures 
and the tax bases. If taxes were cut until 2020 according to Figure 1, unpopular reversals of these cuts 
would be necessary all subsequent years. No available information suggests that the necessary tax 
burden would stabilize if the simulation period were extended beyond 2060. One may also criticize 
both scenarios underlying Figure 1 for underrating the future tax burden. First, they assume 
prolongation of the present levels of the average working hours despite real growth in consumption 
possibilities per capita, which implies a break with long run historical trends. Second, assuming 0.5 
percent annual growth in man hours per users of hospital services and long-term care, and no such 
standard improvements in other individual tax financed services, is cautious compared with historical 
trends. Many projections of government spending on health services and long-term care assume an 
income elasticity of health services equal to or greater than unity, see e.g. Acemoglu, Finkelstein and 
Notowidigdo (2013) and OECD (2013b). The assumptions in the no-reform scenario imply that 
growing public pension expenditures is the dominant source behind the gap in growth rates of 
government revenues and expenditures after 2020. The public pension expenditures grow from 6.7 to 
12.8 percent of GDP-M from 2014 to 2060. 
 
The most important reason for the rise in the GDP-M share of public pension expenditures with the 
old system is that this system does not include any actuarial adjustment mechanism which modifies 
the effect of the increase in longevity, which averages 4.8 years for individuals aged 62 years in the 
period 2013-2060 in this scenario. In addition, the large cohorts born after World War II will replace 
less populous mid-war cohorts. Moreover, public pension benefits in payment are assumed to be 
indexed to wage growth with the old system, and the wage rate grows faster than the GDP deflator. 
Also, maturing of the existing pension system, as well as growth in female labour market earnings, 
contributes to raise the average annual public old age benefit. Deflated by the wage rate, this benefit is 
3.4 percent higher in 2060 than in 2014.12 
                                                     
12This average growth in the annual wage deflated old-age pension benefit conceals a great difference between Norwegian 
residents and non-residents. For residents this benefit is 13.6 percent higher in 2060 compared with the 2014-level. For non-
residents the benefit is 8.8 percent lower in 2060 than in 2014.  
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5.2 Fiscal effects 
Figure 1 shows that the pension reform is likely to reduce the growth in the fiscal gap significantly 
after 2020. The model simulations suggest that the period where the fiscal gap declines is extended 
from 2020 to 2025. With the new system the rising normalized fiscal gap passes zero from below in 
2050, and 2.8 percent in 2060, which is 5.9 percentage points lower than in the no-reform scenario. 
The slight increase in the fiscal gap in the first four years after the implementation of the reform is due 
to an increase in early withdrawal of old-age pension benefits. Recall that the new system offers a high 
degree of flexibility with respect to withdrawal of benefits for employees in the private sector, who 
may combine work and pension after the age of 62. Increased early withdrawal reduces, cet. par, 
public pension expenditures in later years. Section 6.3 discusses the importance of changes in the 
benefit withdrawal behaviour. 
 
Table 2 shows that the main contributions to the reduction of the normalized fiscal gap come from the 
fall in the GDP shares of the government expenditures. In 2060 reform reduces the GDP-M share of 
primary expenditures by 6.5 percentage points from 58.6 to 52.1 percent. The main source of this is 
the fall in the GDP-M share of public old-age pensions from 12.8 percent without reform to 9.4 
percent in the reform scenario.  
Table 2. Fiscal effects of the pension reform. Deviations between the share of government budget 
components in mainland GDP (GDP-M) in the reform scenario and the no-reform scenario 
(base). Percentage points 
  2020 2040 2060 
Primary revenues 0.1 -0.1 -0.1
  Net indirect taxes, mainland 0.0 0.2 0.3
  Direct taxes from households 0.3 0.0 -0.2
  Social security taxes -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
  Other revenues -0.2 -0.1 0.0
Primary expenditures -0.8 -4.3 -6.5
  Transfers to households -0.1 -2.5 -3.8
     Public old-age pensions -0.2 -2.3 -3.4
  Government consumption -0.6 -1.6 -2.3
  Other expenditures 0.0 -0.2 -0.4
Primary deficit 0.9 4.1 6.3
  Net returns to financial wealth -0.4 -0.8 -0.8
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Figure 2. Effects of the pension reform. Deviations between the reform scenario and the no-
reform scenario (base). Percent 
 
 
The negative reform effect on the GDP-M share of government consumption is solely caused by the 
increase in GDP-M resulting from the reform effect on employment. By assumption, government 
consumption is identical in both scenarios. The small effects on the GDP-M shares of the tax revenues 
reflect that the corresponding tax bases are very closely related to GDP-M. Thus, the reform effect on 
employment and GDP-M implies that important fiscal effects are obscured when measured in terms of 
changes in GDP-M ratios. Figure 2 shows the time path of the key fiscal effects measured in terms of 
percentage deviation between the two scenarios. Table 3 provides more details on the relative fiscal 
effects in 2060, as well as the corresponding absolute deviations between the present values of the 
budget components measured in 2014-prices. The present values are computed by discounting the 
variables measured in current prices by a nominal discount rate of 4 percent. This discount rate equals 
the growth rate of the average nominal wage rate. Thus, the present values may alternatively be 
interpreted as current values deflated by the nominal wage growth rate.  
 
Among the items listed in Table 3 the reduction in public old-age pension expenditures makes the 
strongest contribution to the improvement of government finances, both in relative and absolute terms. 
Compared with the no-reform scenario in 2060, these expenditures fall by 20.5 percent. Discounted 
back to 2014, this amounts to 78.6 billion 2014-NOK. However, public old-age pension expenditures 
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will grow strongly over time also with the new system in place. Deflated by the average wage rate, 
these expenditures will pass 2.2 times the 2010-level in 2060. The basic reasons are the growth in the 
number of pensioners and the average entitlements for female workers.  
 
The negative reform effect on the public old-age pension expenditures is somewhat modified by an 
increase in other government cash transfers to households. The reason is that the increase in the 
number of relatively old employees caused by delayed retirement is mitigated by an increase in the 
number of recipients of disability benefits, unemployment benefits and sickness benefits. Compared 
with the no-reform scenario in 2060 the increases in these transfers add to 18.8 billion 2014-NOK, 
which brings the reduction of total cash transfers to household down to 59.7 billion 2014-NOK, i.e. 
8.1 percent.  
Table 3. Fiscal effects of the pension reform in 2060 with the old system as base. Percentage 
deviations and discounted absolute deviations in billions 2010-NOK 
 Percentage
deviations
Discounted absolute deviations, billion 
2014-NOK
Primary revenues 8.1 106.9
  Net indirect taxes, mainland 11.3 43.5
  Direct taxes from households 7.2 30.9
  Social security taxes 5.5 20.9
  Other revenues 1.8 11.7
Primary expenditures -3.5 -61.7
  Transfers to households -8.1 -59.7
    Public old-age pensions -20.5 -78.6
  Government consumption 0.0 0.0
  Other expenditures -1.4 -1.9
Memo 
Employment 7.1
GDP, Mainland 8.4
 
Interestingly, the positive revenue effect due to tax base expansion dominates the reduction in 
government expenditures. In present value terms the reform implies that the primary revenues in 2060 
are 96.5 billion 2014-NOK (corresponding to 7.3 percent) higher than in the no-reform scenario. The 
corresponding fall in the present value of primary expenditures equals 61.7 billion 2014-NOK (3.5 
percent). This demonstrates the importance of the labour supply responses, the assumption that all 
additional labour supply becomes employed without any drop in the real wage rate, and the 
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assumption that all the additional employment is absorbed by the private sector. Moreover, the 
equilibrium adjustments of the various tax bases demonstrate the empirical significance of taking 
properly account of the fact that increased employment in the private sector raise almost all tax bases 
in the mainland economy.  
6. Sensitivity analyses 
We examine the robustness of the fiscal effects of the reform to variations in 1) longevity; 2) 
retirement behaviour; 3) benefit withdrawal behaviour; 4) life expectancy adjustments for earlier 
disabled. This selection is motivated by what have been topical issues in the Norwegian pension 
debate, as well as insights from relevant recent studies specified below. This section focuses on the 
reform effects on the normalized fiscal gap. Appendix 2 presents results for some other relevant 
variables.  
6.1. Longevity 
For decades, the observed decline in mortality among the elderly in Norway has proved hard to 
predict. As explained above, a main intention of the new system is to make public pension 
expenditures less dependent on changes in longevity. The basic mechanism is the actuarial life 
expectancy adjustment, which, cet. par., reduces the annual benefits when life expectancy increases. 
Delayed retirement counteracts this effect by raising entitlements and reducing the number of pension 
years, provided that the timing of benefit withdrawals follows the retirement adjustments. Below we 
provide a more focused examination of the empirical importance of these actuarial mechanisms by re-
simulating both the baseline and reform scenarios under three different assumptions on average 
longevity. We compare the most plausible Medium (longevity growth) alternative, presented in Section 
5, with two alternatives. Whereas life expectancy for new-borns increases by 6.9 years for men and by 
5.6 years for women from 2013 till 2060 in the Medium alternative, the corresponding increments are -
0.2 and 1.8 years, respectively, in the Low (longevity growth) alternative. The corresponding 
increments in the High (longevity growth) alternative are, respectively, 11.5 and 10.2 years.  
 
Figure 3 confirms that the reform effect on the normalized fiscal gap becomes stronger the higher is 
the longevity growth. Whereas medium longevity growth implies that the reform reduces the 
normalized fiscal gap by 5.9 percentage points in 2060, the corresponding effects are 3.1 and 8.8 
points in, respectively, the low and high longevity growth scenarios. 
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Figure 3. Reform effects on the normalized fiscal gap under three different assumptions on 
longevity growth (High, Medium, Low). Absolute deviations between the new system and the old 
system (base). Percentage points 
 
 
The reform effect on both government revenues and expenditures become stronger the more longevity 
increases, see Appendix 2, Table A2.1. Due to the incentives in the new system, the reform raises 
employment by 7.1 percent in 2060 (185 000 persons) in the Medium alternative. The corresponding 
effects in the High and Low growth alternatives are, respectively, 9.3 percent (260 000) and 4.7 
percent (108 000). The employment effects are nearly perfectly correlated with the corresponding 
effects on the tax bases. 
 
The expenditure reductions are driven by the reform effect on the public pension expenditures. In 2060 
the reform reduces these expenditures by 20.5 percent in the case of medium longevity growth, by 
26.2 percent in the high growth alternative, and by 9.9 percent in the case of low longevity growth; see 
Table A2.1 and Figure A2.1 in Appendix 2. Variations in longevity have a much smaller effect on the 
old age pension expenditures in the new system than in the old one, see Appendix 2, Figure A2.2. 
What remains of this effect in the new system reflects foremost that the life expectancy adjustment of 
old-age benefits is more lenient for those who are disabled before they become old-age pensioners.  
 
We conclude that the reform is indeed likely to work as intended: The life expectancy adjustment built 
into the new system neutralizes most of the direct effect on old-age pension expenditures caused by 
changes in life expectancy, whereas the old system did not have any such moderating mechanism. 
Moreover, combined with the stronger link between earnings and entitlements, this life expectancy 
mechanism will expand employment and tax bases when longevity increases.  
‐10
‐8
‐6
‐4
‐2
0
2
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
High
Medium
Low
25 
6.2. Employment responses to new incentives 
Labour supply behaviour is uncertain in general, and the empirical basis of estimating long run 
behavioural effects of a specific pension reform, implemented as late as 2011, will necessarily remain 
weak for several years. Moreover, it is uncertain to what extent the additional labour supply from   
individuals aged 60 years or more actually will be employed. Below, we compare the most plausible 
reform effects laid out in Section 4 and 5 with the corresponding effects resulting from two more 
extreme assumptions about retirement responses. In the No delay alternative we assume that the 
propensities for retirement are almost unaffected by the reform. In the Max delay alternative 
retirement workers delay as in the medium alternative, but the propensities to enter disability by age 
are also reduced corresponding to 2/3 of the growth in life expectancy, as a result of improved health 
among the elderly.  
Figure 4. Reform effects on the normalized fiscal gap under three different assumptions about 
delay of retirement in the new system. Absolute deviations between the new system and the old 
system (base). Percentage points 
 
 
The reform effects on the normalized fiscal gap are quite sensitive to retirement behaviour, see Figure 
4. In 2060 the reform reduces the normalized fiscal gap by 5.9 percentage points in the Medium delay 
alternative, 2.7 points in the No delay alternative, and by 7.9 points in the Max delay alternative. This 
sensitivity is dominated by the close relationship between employment and most tax bases in the 
Norwegian mainland economy. The reform effects on employment in 2060 are 7.1 and 11.1 percent in 
the Medium and the Max delay alternatives, respectively, whereas employment falls by 0.6 percent in 
the No delay alternative, see Appendix 2, Table A2.2.  On the other hand, the actuarial mechanisms in 
the new system make government pension expenditures rather insensitive to the retirement behaviour; 
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the expenditure effect of a decline in the number of old age pensioners caused by delayed retirement is 
nearly neutralized by the increase in the average annual benefit, see Appendix 2, figures A2.3 and 
A2.4. 
6.3 Benefit withdrawal behaviour 
The new public pension system allows employees in the private sector to combine work and pension 
from the age of 62 in a rather flexible way, provided sufficient entitlements. Advancing withdrawal 
changes the time profile of the individual benefits for the average person, but not the expected present 
value of the benefit flow for the average person. However, combining early withdrawal with work 
may be beneficial for persons with shorter remaining life expectancy than the average person in a 
given cohort. It may also be beneficial for individuals with expected pensions slightly above the 
minimum pension due to very favourable tax allowances. In 2012 almost 45 percent of those who 
were entitled had withdrawn old age pensions before the age of 67, and about 2/3 of old age 
pensioners below the age of 67 had chosen to work in combination with withdrawing pensions; see 
Dahl and Lien (2013). These shares are far higher than expected before the reform.  
 
The most plausible projection, presented in Section 5, relies on the assumption of a Medium degree of 
early withdrawal: those who obtain some tax allowances withdraw benefits early in combination with 
continued work. In a Maximum early withdrawal alternative we assume that all persons in the private 
sector of age 63 years or more, with sufficient entitlements, withdraw pensions in addition to labour 
incomes. We also study a No early withdrawal alternative. 
 
Of course, advancing withdrawal of benefits raises, cet. par., the public old-age pension expenditures 
in the first decades. We find the greatest impact of withdrawal on these expenditures in 2014, where 
they are 17 billion 2014-NOK (10 percent) higher in the Medium alternative than in the No early 
withdrawal alternative, see Appendix 2, Figure A2.6. In the Maximum early withdrawal alternative 
these expenditures would have increased further by 6 billion NOK, or 3.8 percentage points. However, 
we see no reason why changes in withdrawal behaviour should affect other public budget components 
than the old-age pension expenditures, net of taxes. Although early withdrawal means lower annual 
benefits for the recipient over the entire remaining life time, additional expenditures in the first 
decades does not imply lower expenditures in the long run. All reform effects are approximately 
invariant to the withdrawal behaviour after 2040, see Table A2.3 and the Figures A2.5- A2.7 in 
Appendix 2. First, births and immigration imply a nearly constant number of persons entering the 
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group of old-age pensioners during a year. Second, the actuarial properties of the new system 
neutralize the effect of increased longevity on the balance between young and old old-age pensioners.  
6.4. Life expectancy adjustments for former disabled 
An unsettled reform issue is how the life expectancy adjustment should work for those who are 
disability pensioners before they are transferred to the public old-age pension scheme at the age of 67. 
So far the adjustment for this group has been half as strong as the adjustment applying for former 
employees. We will refer to this practice as “Half protection”. The argument for such a protection of 
disabled is that earlier disabled cannot counteract life expectancy adjustments by delaying retirement. 
This concern should be balanced against concerns about the economic incentives to retire early 
through disability insurance. This trade-off is discussed in e.g. Börsch-Supan, Hank and Jürges (2005) 
and Galaasen (2014a). We compare Half protection with two extreme alternatives: 1) No protection, 
i.e. the same life expectancy adjustment for all, and 2) Full protection, i.e. no life expectancy 
adjustment for former disabled.  
 
Variations in this kind of protection affect two government budget components only: old-age pension 
expenditures and taxes collected from pensioners. The fiscal effects grow relatively slowly over time 
from negligible magnitudes in the first couple of decades; see Appendix 2, Table A2.4 and the Figures 
A2.8 – A2.10. This reflects gradual phasing out of a general lenient practice of life expectancy 
adjustment, as well as longevity growth. The effects are still relatively small in 2060: Full protection 
raises the normalized fiscal gap by 0.4 percentage points from the Half protection scenario. Going 
from Half to No protection reduces this gap by 0.3 points. In 2060 “half protection” causes old-age 
pension expenditures to be 11 billion NOK, or 3.8 percent higher than in the case of no protection. 
Full protection would have increased the expenditures further with about 13 billion NOK.  
7. Conclusions 
Estimates of pension reform effects typically belong to one of three strands of the literature: (1) Highly 
detailed dynamic microsimulation of purely mechanical effects on individual benefits and government 
pension expenditures; (2) Econometric studies of behavioural effects of particular elements of pension 
system, especially labour supply; (3) CGE estimates of the long run effects of rather stylized reforms 
on employment, fiscal sustainability and the inter-generational welfare distribution. This paper 
integrates these approaches in order to evaluate to what extent the Norwegian pension reform of 2011 
is likely to reach its main goal, which is to contribute substantially to improve long run fiscal 
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sustainability without large cuts in the public old-age pension benefits. We combine detailed dynamic 
microsimulation with a consistent CGE model of the total economy, including all government 
revenues and expenditures, and we exploit the available econometric evidence on presumptive 
important behavioural adjustments.  
 
Our simulations show that it is harder to motivate cost saving reforms of the public welfare schemes in 
Norway than in most other countries. Until about 2035 it would be feasible to finance the old pension 
system and the other existent welfare schemes at tax rates lower than the present ones, without 
violating the present policy rule for saving the government petroleum revenues. However, Norway 
faces a fundamental fiscal sustainability problem in the long run since government expenditures will 
grow significantly faster than the tax base after 2020. This growth in the fiscal gap is basically a result 
of the combination of ageing and generous welfare schemes. The Norwegian pension reform is 
tailored to reduce the growth in the fiscal gap by mitigating the long run growth in the pension 
expenditures and by raising tax bases through stronger labour supply incentives, rather than being 
immediately cost saving. The key reform element in this respect is a more actuarial adjustment of the 
annual old age benefit to changes in life expectancy and early retirement. 
Table 4. Estimates of key variables in 2060 based on the most plausible assumptions. All 
variables except the employment share are measured in percent of GDP of the mainland 
economy. Percent 
 
2013 2020 2060 
Observed No-reform Reform No-reform Reform
Fiscal gap 0,0 -3,6 -4,4 8,7 2,8
Government primary 
expenditures 
49,8 49,0 48,2 58,6 52,1
Public old-age pension 
expenditures 
6,3 7,6 7,4 12,8 9,4
Man years (1620 hours) per 
capita 
0,46 0,46 0,46 0,42 0,45
 
Our results, summarized in Table 4, suggest that the reform is indeed likely to make a great impact in 
the intended direction. Maintaining the old system would imply an increase in the share of the public 
old-age pension expenditures in GDP-M from 7.6 to 12.8 percent, from 2020 till 2060. With the new 
system the corresponding rise is reduced to 2 percentage points. The GDP-M share of the fiscal gap 
will be significantly negative in most years in the period 2013-2060 in the most plausible reform 
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scenario, but it will still rise from -4.5 percent around 2025 to nearly 3 percent in 2060. Thus, the 
pension reform alone is far from sufficient to eliminate the Norwegians long run problem of fiscal 
sustainability. This is no surprise; the pension reform is not intended to curb the growth in government 
spending on health services and long-term care. On the other hand, the fiscal prospects would look 
much more worrying if the old system were maintained. In this scenario the normalized fiscal gap 
increases from -3.5 percent around 2020 to nearly 9 percent in 2060.  
 
The lion share of the negative reform effect on government expenditures and the fiscal gap comes 
from delayed retirement, which reduces the number of old-age pensioners and raises employment in 
the private sector, and thereby most non-petroleum tax bases. Prolongation of the old system would 
reduce man years (= 1620 man hours) per capita from the present 0.46 to 0.42 in 2060. The pension 
reform raises this ratio to 0.45 in 2060. In 2060 employment is 7.1 percent higher in the reform 
scenario than in the no-reform scenario. We regard this as a strong effect. Our results demonstrate that 
one would seriously underestimate the fiscal effects of the pension reform if behavioural effects and 
equilibrium effects on tax bases were ignored. Moreover, the employment effect of the reform implies 
that most of the reductions in public old-age pension expenditures results from a decrease in the 
number of recipients rather than lower benefits.  
 
Larger longevity increases and stronger labour supply responses strengthen the positive fiscal reform 
effects. This sensitivity of mortality and labour supply responses is caused by the actuarial life 
expectancy mechanism in the new system. No such mechanism existed in the old system. The 
combination of this mechanism and increasing longevity is also the basic reason why the reform 
effects grow over time. Our assessed reform effects are quite robust with respect to realistic variations 
in benefit withdrawal behaviour, as well as variations in the life expectancy mechanism applying to 
those who are disabled before they become old-age pensioners.  
 
This study leaves several topical issues for future research. First, it would be interesting to assess the 
social efficiency effects of the reform. Since the effective tax rates on labour income are large in 
Norway, the strong positive reform effect on employment is likely to entail a significant social 
efficiency gain. This gain may be compared with the distributional effects assessed in Holmøy and 
Stensnes (2008) and Christensen et al. (2012). Second, it would be interesting to estimate the effects 
of extending the reform to cover employees in the public sector, especially because population ageing 
is likely to raise the employment share of the public sector. Third, one should examine more carefully 
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our use of the standard assumption that firms will be willing to employ any increase in the labour 
supply from old individuals, without any changes in real wage rates or other conditions.  
 
Although the use of large empirical models in this paper has given priority to realism and gone a long 
way to account for all available information relevant for the policy evaluation, there is obvious scope 
for methodological improvements. Specifically, consistency can be improved by merging the most 
important aspects of individual life courses and the general equilibrium mechanisms into an OLG-
model with income heterogeneity within each cohort. Moreover, the present analysis has not specified 
the policy responses to the reform effect on the fiscal gap. Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) show that 
lower tax rates reinforce the positive reform effects on employment and government finances.  
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Appendix 1: Fiscal effects of the pension reform under the most 
plausible assumptions 
Table A1.1. Fiscal effects of the pension reform. Percentage deviations between the government 
budget components in the reform scenario and the no-reform scenario (base) 
   2020 2040 2060 
Primary revenues 2.6 5.9 8.1 
  Net indirect taxes, mainland 2.5 7.5 11.3 
  Direct taxes from households 4.7 6.1 7.2 
  Social security taxes 2.0 4.3 5.5 
  Other revenues 1.0 4.7 9.5 
Primary expenditures 0.8 -2.2 -3.5 
  Transfers to households 1.7 -5.6 -8.1 
    Public old-age pensions -0.7 -15.9 -20.5 
  Government consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Other expenditures 1.3 0.7 -1.4 
Fiscal gap 28.9 -50.6 -38.2 
Memo 
Employment 2.3 5.4 7.1 
GDP, Mainland 2.4 6.2 8.4 
Table A1.2. Fiscal effects of the pension reform. Absolute deviations between the present values 
of government budget components in the reform scenario and the no-reform scenario (base). 
Billions 2010-NOK. Nominal discount rate = 4 percent 
   2020 2040 2060 
Primary revenues 36 79 107 
  Net indirect taxes, mainland 10 31 43 
  Direct taxes from households 17 25 31 
  Social security taxes 6 15 21 
  Other revenues 3 8 12 
Primary expenditures 10 -35 -62 
  Transfers to households 9 -36 -60 
    Public old-age pensions -1 -51 -79 
  Government consumption 0 0 0 
  Other expenditures 1 1 -2 
Fiscal gap -26 -114 -169 
 
  
36 
Appendix 2: More results from the sensitivity analyses 
A2.1. Longevity 
Table A2.1. Fiscal and macroeconomic effects of the pension reform under three different 
assumptions on longevity growth (High, Medium, Low). Percentage deviations between the new 
system and the old system (base) 
   2040 2060 
High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Primary revenues 6.7 5.9 4.5 10.0 8.1 5.5
Primary expenditures -3.6 -2.2 -1.5 -5.3 -3.5 -1.6
   Public old-age pensions -19.6 -15.9 -10.0 -26.2 -20.5 -9.9
 
Employment 6.7 5.4 4.1 9.3 7.1 4.7
GDP, Mainland 7.6 6.2 4.7 11.2 8.4 5.4
Figure A2.1. Reform effect on public old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions 
about longevity growth (High, Medium, Low). Percentage deviations from the no-reform 
scenario.  
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Figure A2.2. Old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions about longevity growth 
(High, Medium, Low). Billion 2014-NOK 
 
A2.2. Delay of retirement 
Table A2.2. Fiscal and macroeconomic effects of the pension reform under different assumptions 
about delayed retirement in the new system (No, Medium, Max). Percentage deviations between 
new system and old system (base) 
    2040     2060   
  No  Medium  Max  No  Medium  Max  
Primary revenues 0.1 5.9 7.9 -0.6 8.1 12.2
Primary expenditures -3.1 -2.2 -2.5 -5.1 -3.5 -4.1
   Public old-age pensions -17.9 -15.9 -15.7 -25.1 -20.5 -20.1
 
Employment -0.1 5.4 7.6 -0.6 7.1 11.1
GDP, Mainland -0.2 6.2 8.6 -0.6 8.4 13.1
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Figure A2.3. Reform effect on public old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions 
about delayed retirement in the new system (No, Medium, Max). Percentage deviations from the 
no-reform scenario.  
 
Figure A2.4. Old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions about delayed 
retirement in the new system (No, Medium, Max). Billion 2014-NOK 
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A2.3. Early withdrawal of benefits 
Table A2.3. Fiscal and macroeconomic effects of the pension reform under different assumptions 
about early withdrawal of benefits in the new system (No, Medium, Max). Percentage deviations 
between new system and old system (base) 
    2040     2060   
  No  Medium Max  No  Medium  Max  
Primary revenues 5.8 5.9 5.9 8.1 8.1 8.1
Primary expenditures -2.4 -2.2 -2.1 -3.5 -3.5 -3.6
   Public old-age pensions -16.5 -15.9 -15.3 -20.5 -20.5 -20.8
 
Employment 5.4 5.4 5.4 7.1 7.1 7.1
GDP, Mainland 6.2 6.2 6.2 8.4 8.4 8.4
Figure A2.5. Reform effect on the normalized fiscal gap under different assumptions about early 
withdrawal of benefits in the new system (No, Medium, Max). Absolute deviations between the 
new system and the old system (base). Percentage points  
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Figure A2.6. Reform effect on public old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions 
about early withdrawal of benefits in the new system (No, Medium, Max). Percentage deviations 
from the no-reform scenario.  
 
Figure A2.7. Old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions about early withdrawal 
of benefits in the new system (No, Medium, Max). Billion 2014-NOK 
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A2.4. Protection of former disabled from the life expectancy adjustment 
Table A2.4. Fiscal and macroeconomic effects of the pension reform under different assumptions 
about protection of former disabled old-age pensioners from the life expectancy adjustment (No, 
half, full) in the new system. Percentage deviations between new system and old system (base) 
    2040     2060   
  No  Half Full No  Half Full 
Primary revenues 5.8 5.9 5.9 8.0 8.1 8.3
Primary expenditures -2.6 -2.2 -1.8 -4.1 -3.5 -2.8
   Public old-age pensions -17.8 -15.9 -13.8 -23.3 -20.5 -17.0
 
Employment 5.4 5.4 5.4 7.1 7.1 7.1
GDP, Mainland 6.2 6.2 6.2 8.4 8.4 8.4
Figure A2.8. Reform effect on the normalized fiscal gap under different assumptions about 
protection of the former disabled old-age pensioners from the life expectancy adjustment (No, 
Half, Full) in the new system. Absolute deviations between the new system and the old system 
(base). Percentage points  
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Figure A2.9. Reform effect on public old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions 
about protection of the former disabled old-age pensioners from the life expectancy adjustment 
(No, Half, Full) in the new system. Percentage deviations from the no-reform scenario.  
 
Figure A2.10. Old-age pension expenditures under different assumptions about protection of the 
former disabled old-age pensioners from the life expectancy adjustment (No, Half, Full) in the 
new system. Billion 2014-NOK 
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